

Part I 總分50分。

Please select two of the following three paragraphs and translate them into Chinese. Then, by using one or two sentences in either Chinese or English, please note also the crucial part of the two paragraphs selected.

1. To illustrate regarding fair conditions: the parties are symmetrically situated in the original position. This models our considered conviction that in matters of basic political justice citizens are equal in all relevant respects: that is, that they possess to a sufficient degree the requisite powers of moral personality and the other capacities that enable them to be normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. Thus, in accordance with the precept of formal equality that those equal (similar) in all relevant respects are to be treated equally (similarly), citizens' representatives are to be situated symmetrically in the original position. Otherwise we would not think that position fair to citizens as free and equal.

From John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, edited by Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 18.

2. Naturalism does not imply atheism. Anaximander and Heraclitus (among others) regard the world order as a manifestation of divine justice; they see divine action in the order itself, not (as the Homeric view suggests) in capricious interference by the gods. But some pre-Socratic systems, especially the Atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, clearly tend to eliminate any role for a designing or controlling intelligence; given the motions of the atoms in the void for infinite past time, and given the laws of their combination, nothing else is needed (in the Atomist view) to explain the existence, maintenance, and eventual dissolution of the world order.

From T. H. Irwin, "Plato: The intellectual background" in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, Edited by Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 52.

3. We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: if conceptual schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. If conceptual schemes aren't associated with languages in this way, the original problem is needlessly doubled, for then we would have to imagine

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the mind, with its ordinary categories, operating with a language with its organizing structure. Under the circumstances we would certainly want to ask who is to be master.

From Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 47 (1973 -1974), p. 6.

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Part II 總分 50 分：第一題是必答題（25 分）；第二與第三題，任選一題（25 分）

(1) Please translate the following text into Chinese.

There are actually three, or at least three, questions about the ontology of reasons for action. The first question is what sorts of items count as reasons for action—in particular, whether reasons are provided by our mental states and attitudes, or by the facts upon which those states and attitudes are based. (I'll explain this contrast in greater detail below.) The second question is what kinds of facts about actions are relevant to reasons, and in particular whether reasons always spring from the goals achieved through action or sometimes spring from other properties of the actions, say that the action is just or kind. This question is most familiar to us from the debate between consequentialists and deontologists. The third question is how reasons for action are related to actions themselves, and in particular whether this relation is to be understood causally or in some other way. Put in more familiar terms, this is the question what we mean when we say that someone is “motivated.”

Text from Christine M. Korsgaard, “Acting for a Reason”, in *The Constitution of Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 208.

(2) Please translate the following text into Chinese.

If it is true that we can make sense of the choice between existence as a horse and existence as a human, then—whichever way the choice would go—we can make sense of the idea that the life of one kind of animal possesses greater value than the life of another; and if this is so, then the claim that the life of every being has equal value is on very weak ground. We cannot defend this claim by saying that every being's life is all-important for it, because we have now accepted a comparison that takes a more objective—or at least intersubjective—stance and thus goes beyond the value of the life of a being considered solely from the point of view of that being.

Text from Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 91.

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(3) Please translate the following text into Chinese.

We find here one clue to why "freedom"—the freedom to choose between good and evil, which is certainly an implicit attribute of the conscious mind in Mencius—never seems to be put forth, in most Chinese thought, as a supreme value. The sages live in a world of harmony with the universe on every level of their being. Their conscious hearts are always at one with their spontaneous hearts. Their senses are under the complete control of their hearts and the fully nourished vital energies of *ch'i* are fully in balance within the body and in harmony with the cosmic *ch'i*. Such sages are beyond the need for the indeterminacies of freedom. The ultimate value, after all, is the good itself, not the freedom to seek the good.

Text from Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 274.

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