

PART I 總分 50 分，每題各 25 分。第 1 題是必答 (25 分) 第 2-3 中任選一題作答 (25 分)

1. Fragment one. Please translate this passage into fluent Chinese (25 分).

The constructed approach, the ordinary way of making and following distinctions, acts according to those distinctions that embody a specific group's sense of what is correct. The adaptive approach, in contrast, embodies the continuing adaptation of feelings, judgments, and actions to changing circumstances. The two approaches, then, differ in fundamental ways. To use the adaptive approach is to base responses on changing circumstances and to make relative judgments that accord with shifting conditions. To use the constructed approach is to act on general principles and to remain relatively unresponsive to shifting circumstances. (In this sense, the distinction resembles that between ethical approaches that focus on virtues and those that focus on rules.) (Yearley, Lee H. 2005. "Daoist Presentation and Persuasion: Wandering among Zhuangzi's Kinds of Language." *Journal of Religions Ethics* 33:3, p. 520.)

2. Fragment two. Please carefully read the following fragment and answer the question below.

Mozi's position has an objectivist ring because he emphasizes external permanence as guiding our use of language. He advocates measurement like standards. Such standards are *one* component of a scientific perspective. Theories of measurement accompanied by operations that yield constant, reliable, results for different evaluators are as crucial to science as is mathematics. In fact, it is only through the measurement hypotheses and the observer invariance of measurement operations that mathematics can be used in science.

The measurement component makes Mozi's position seem universal, realistic, constant, objective, and therefore rational. But Mozi has no conception of proof structure, premises, or conclusions nor does he have the mental apparatus of belief-desire practical rationality. His basic view is that language socialization directs human behavior. He proposes that we reform the process of socialization in accord a standard he thinks is natural, measurable, and therefore both universal and tied to external constancy. (Hansen, Chad. 1992. *A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation*. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, p. 120)

Question. The author holds that it is misleading to attribute a belief in Western *reason* to Mozi (p. 138). On the basis of the quoted fragment, why does he think so? (You may answer this question in Chinese, but do not plainly translate)

3. Fragment three. The following segments (I-V) constitute one passage from *Zhuangzi* chapter 26. Please carefully read the passage and answer the question below.

- (I) 目微為明，耳微為聰；鼻微為顛，口微為甘；心微為知，知微為德。
- (II) 凡道不欲壅，壅則哽，哽而不止則跖，跖則眾害生。
- (III) 物之有知者恃息，其不殷，非天之罪。天之穿之，日夜无降，人則顧塞其
- (IV) 胞有重閤，心有天遊。室无空虚，則婦姑勃餼；心无天遊，則六鑿相攘。
- (V) 大林丘山之善於人也，亦神者不勝。

Question. Succinctly describe the main point of this passage by making use of its spatial imagery. (You may answer this question in Chinese, but do not plainly translate).

PART II 總分 50 分，如下三題，任選二題作答，每題各 25 分。英文題目，請盡可能精確地翻譯為中文。中文題目，請以通俗白話譯述出來，並闡述其要旨。

1. Mengzi [孟子] uses his particular conception of human nature to provide a response to both Mohism [墨家] and Yangism [楊朱學派]. As we have seen, Mengzi agrees with the Yangists that humans have a nature that they should follow, but argues that the Yangists have supplied an impoverished account of the contents of that nature. Against the Mohists, Mengzi argues that there is a natural order of development of human compassion, and that, as a matter of psychological fact, humans must learn to love members of their own family before they can learn to love strangers (*Mengzi* 7A15, 7A45). Some Mohists in Mengzi's era seem to have conceded this point, but argued that the feeling of compassion cultivated in the family should be extended outward to love everyone equally. However, Mengzi claims that, given the way in which our compassion develops out of love of kin, any effort to love everyone equally violates our naturally greater compassion for family members (*Mengzi* 3A5). Finally, Mengzi argues that the effort to base one's actions on *li* 利, "benefit" or "profit," even if it is the profit of one's kingdom as a whole, will be self-defeating (*Mengzi* 1A1). (from Philip Ivanhoe, Bryan Van Norden (eds.), *Readings in classical Chinese Philosophy*, New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001, p. 113.)

2. The doctrine of *karma* is correlated with the concept of self. In Buddhism, the true self is a psycho-physical self, which is defined essentially in terms of a stream of consciousness that continues in spite of the demise of the physical body it is associated with. On the other hand, the physically-instantiated self is caught up in a cycle of birth (*jati*; in Pali and Sanskrit) and consequent decay and death (*jaramarama*; in Pali and Sanskrit). Buddhism rejects the dominant view that identifies physical existence with continuity of self. It holds instead that the self and physical existence are separate and therefore, cessation of bodily existence does not imply the cessation of self. Continuity of self is what underlies the cycle of rebirth, *samsara* (in Sanskrit). According to a more trivial and punitive version of the ethics of *samsara* and *karma*, to have a short and miserable life or to be reborn as a being belonging to a less-than-human species is punishment of sorts for the negative consequences accumulated by a particular stream of consciousness. Such a theory is of course a self-sealer but it also raises more general and important questions about *karma* and rebirth and how we are to understand the connections between particular acts and their implications for streams of consciousness. It is also unclear whether different streams of consciousness might merge or re-form such that an "individual" person, say, might experience any number of different streams. (from Karyn Lai, *An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 241-242.)

3. 爾時，阿難（Ananda）語闍陀（Channa）言：「我親從佛聞，教摩訶迦旃延（Kaccayana），言：『世人顛倒，依於二邊，若有、若無；世人取諸境界，心便計著。迦旃延！若不受、不取、不住、不計於我，此苦生時生，滅時滅。迦旃延！於此不疑、不惑，不由於他而能自知，是名正見，如來所說。所以者何？迦旃延！如實正觀世間集者，則不生世間無見；如實正觀世間滅，則不生世間有見。迦旃延！如來離於二邊，說於中道，所謂：此有故彼有，此生故彼生；謂·緣無明有行，乃至生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱苦集。所謂：此無故彼無，此滅故彼滅；謂·無明滅則行滅，乃至生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱苦滅。』。」（《雜阿含經·第 262 經》，T. 99, vol. 2, pp. 66c-67a.）