

一、仔細閱讀下文之後，請以流暢的中文闡述作者認為「中國哲學」學門誕生之際發生了什麼狀況。(300-350字;25分)

The strange thing is that this introduction of philosophy in China around the end of the nineteenth century, together with other disciplines and above all in the context of radical institutional changes, has practically marked the end of this very tradition of the masters. Those who nevertheless continue to study the old masters in a separate branch within philosophy departments no longer call themselves "masters," but rather "specialists" in Chinese philosophy. The curriculum of this separate branch consists mainly of traditional Chinese thought as it existed up until the introduction of Western thinking. Historical compilations of Chinese philosophy also often stop at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth. Thus, at the moment when Chinese philosophy was respectively created or recognized, it also largely ceased to exist as living tradition. "Chinese philosophy" seems to have died of its own birth: "Chinese philosophy" (of the traditional masters) and "philosophy in China" (at modern universities) exclude each other in the sense that, since the introduction of the latter, in the former could only continue to exist in a foreign institutional setting, as a separated corpus and object of study. The fatal allergic reaction that the Chinese masters have developed toward this strange discipline raises questions regarding their combination: is this actually Chinese? And is it still philosophy?

二、仔細閱讀下文之後，請以流暢的中文說明作者對何種思想史理解的方式提出何種疑問。(300-350字;25分)

Some of the thinkers of the Warring States period themselves attempt to furnish us with their own accounts of contemporary winds of doctrine. When we examine the writings of Mencius, Xunzi, Hanfeizi, and chapter 33 of the *Book of Zhuangzi*, all of which provide such accounts, we find that they know nothing of Taoism, Legalism, Eclecticism, and they treat separate individual figures who are later subsumed under these large categories as representatives of quite diverse modes of thought. The netire category of "eclectic" (*za*) applied to a large group of personalities, who have unfortunately left us with only small fragments of their *œuvre*, is a highly suspect, residual category. Thus, to describe the thought of figure X as "mixture of Taoism and Legalism" at a time when these streams of thought were themselves not perceived as coherent wholes may be entirely unjustified. X may indeed combine themes, concepts, and even *problematiques* which were later assigned to these separate "schools," but this way of combining them may in fact have been quite as logical and coherent as that of the main protagonists of the major schools. This does not mean that the Han doxographers were entirely mistaken when they retrospectively referred to Taoism and Legalism. These may indeed be discussed as at least partially distinguishable general stream but the enterprise now becomes problematic and highly hazardous.

見背面

三、請詳細閱讀下列文句，然後回答如下幾個問題（25分）

1. 希臘語所引導的哲學發展可以分為幾個階段，請分別說明這些階段在哲學史中所佔據的意義？
2. 請略為說明希臘化時期最具有代表性之哲學思想為何？
3. 請說明希臘哲學最後發展成爲什麼樣的哲學？

The history of the Greek-speaking world in antiquity may be divided into three periods: that of the free City States, which was brought to an end by Philip and Alexander; that of the Macedonian domination, of which the last remnant was extinguished by the Roman annexation of Egypt after the death of Cleopatra; and finally that of the Roman Empire. Of these three periods, the first is characterized by freedom and disorder, and second by subjection and disorder, the third by subjection and order. The second of these periods is known as the Hellenistic age. In science and mathematics, the work done during this period is the best ever achieved by the Greeks. In philosophy, it includes the foundation of the Epicurean and Stoic schools, and also of skepticism as a definitely formulated doctrine; it is therefore still important philosophically, though less so than the period of Plato and Aristotle. After the third century B.C., there is nothing really new in Greek philosophy until the Neo-Platonists in the third century A.D. But meanwhile the Roman world was being prepared for the victory of Christianity.

四、請詳細閱讀下列文句，然後回答如下幾個問題（25分）

1. 道德屬於規範範疇，那麼科學呢？
2. 有關道德討論的方面，休謨(D. Hume)教導我們什麼？
3. 爲什麼道德規範有時必須訴諸超自然呢？

Morality is a normative domain. It concerns how the world ought to be, not how it is. The investigation of morality seems to require a methodology that differs from the methods used in the sciences. At least, that seems to be the case if the investigator has normative ambitions. If the investigator wants to proscribe, it is not enough to describe. As Hume taught us, there is no way to derive an ought from an is. More precisely, there is no way to deduce a statement that has prescriptive force (a statement that expresses an unconditional obligation) from statements that are purely descriptive. No facts about how the world is configured entails that you ought to refrain from stealing or killing or blowing up buildings. Hume's Law is appealing because it makes morality seem special; moral truths are unlike the cool truths of science. But, on one reading, Hume's Law is a recipe for moral nihilism. By insulating moral truths from scientific methods, it may imply that morality is supernatural. If so, morality should go the way of spirits and fairies. That is a path I want to resist.