

Part I 翻譯題，第 1 題是必答題（25 分）；第 2 與第 3 題，任選一題（25 分）

1. Please translate the following text into Chinese.

Consider three statements, each of which, in its different way, expresses a view that moral opinions, or moral judgments, or moral outlooks are 'merely subjective':

- (a) A man's moral judgments merely state (or express) his own attitudes.
- (b) Moral judgments can't be proved, established, shown to be true as scientific statements can; they are matters of individual opinion.
- (c) There are no moral facts; there are only the sorts of facts that science or common observation can discover, and the values that men place on those facts.

The three statements come very close to one another, and in discussions of subjectivism and objectivism one often finds versions of the three being used virtually interchangeably. They are, indeed, genuinely related to one another. Yet they are significantly different.

[Text from Bernard Williams, *Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 14.]

2. Please translate the following text into Chinese.

If some events are probable, without being certain, others are improbable. If a coin has a strong bias for heads, say 0.9, then tails has a nonvanishing probability, and a small percentage of the tosses will in fact result in tails. It seems strange to say that the results of tosses in which the coin lands heads-up can be explained, while the results of those tosses of the very same coin in which tails show are inexplicable. To be sure, the head-outcomes far outnumber the tail-outcomes, but is it not an eccentric prejudice that leads us to discriminate against the minority, condemning its members to the realm of the inexplicable?

[Text from Wesley C. Salmon, *Causality and Explanation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 97.]

3. Please translate the following text into Chinese.

But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? I answer, It may: But this is no objection to the present doctrine. When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it.

[Text from David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 479.]

II 閱讀問答題（共50分，每小題10分）

Briefly but in complete sentences answer the following questions according to the text below!

[Text from Arthur C. Danto, *What Art Is* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2013), pp. x - xi.]

1. What is for Plato the best way to teach the young?
2. Art is for Plato imitation. What is it for Aristotle?
3. Does art as practiced in the present situation consist in imitations?
4. What is the attractive triad in Kant's *The Critique of Judgment*?
5. What is the author's reason that we cannot define art as imitation?

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In Book Ten of *The Republic*, Plato's character—Socrates—suggested that if you want to imitate, nothing could be better for that than a mirror, which will give you perfect reflections of whatever you aim the mirror at, and better than an artist can usually achieve. So let's get rid of the artists. The Greeks used texts like *The Iliad* pedagogically, to teach right conduct. But philosophers know the highest things, what Plato called ideas. Once the artists were out of the way, philosophers could teach and serve as rulers not susceptible to corruption.

In any case, no one can deny that art as practiced consisted in imitations or capturing appearances, to paraphrase modern art historians. How different from the present situation! "I am very interested in how one approaches that topic—What is Art," writes my friend the artist Tom Rose in a personal note. "The question that comes up in every class and in every context." It is as if imitation disappeared, and something else took its place. In the eighteenth century, when aesthetics was invented or discovered, the thought was that art contributed beauty, hence gave pleasure to those with taste. Beauty, pleasure, and taste were an attractive triad, taken seriously by Kant in the early pages of his masterpiece, *The Critique of Judgment*. After Kant—and Hume before him—there were Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and John Dewey, each delivering marvelous but conflicting theses. And then there were the artists themselves, with paintings and sculptures to sell in galleries and art fairs and biennials. Small wonder the question of what is art came up "in every class and every context." So—what is art? What we know from the cacophony of artistic argument is that there is too much art that is nonimitational for us to read Plato except for the sake of his views. This was a first step. It was Aristotle who carried it much further, by applying it to dramatic presentations—tragedies and comedies—which he argued were imitations of actions. Antigone was the model of a wife, Socrates was not quite the model of a husband, and so on.

My thought is that if some art is imitation and some art is not, neither term belongs to the *definition* of art as philosophically understood. A property is part of the definition only if it belongs to every work of art there is. With the advent of Modernism, art backed away from mirror images, or, better, photography set the standard of fidelity. Its advantage over mirror images is that it is able to preserve images, though of course photographic images are liable to fade.

試題隨卷繳回