Part 1

総分50。第1題為必答（25分）:第2-3題中任選一題作答（25分）。

1. Carefully read the following fragment and answer the two questions below.

With these considerations, I have prepared the reader for a reassessment of Graham’s conclusions. Graham has seen, rightly I think, that the Aristotelian categories have an ontological flavour, whereas the Later Mohists’ ‘categories’ are clearly criteria for naming correctly: ‘The definitions of Chinese philosophy are therefore conceived as presenting, not what is essential to being X, but what is indispensable to being called “X”‘. In either case, however, there is the same exclusion of the accidental.’ The Aristotelian *yì esti*, ‘what is it?’ thus is the equivalent of *he wèi* X, ‘what is X called?’ in Chinese. This difference, however, is the result of a different cultural attitude to language and naming. The Greek philosophers in general deny to language any capacity for faithfully mirroring the true nature of reality. They try therefore to construct (or discover) a more firm reality beyond and independent of language, like Plato’s ideas or Democritus’ atoms. The first Chinese philosophers’ confidence in language, on the other hand, has not been shattered in the same way. They believe that a set of rules for the proper use of language is sufficient to clear up all the confusion language might generate. In this way, the Chinese logicians are disadvantaged by the fact that classical Chinese is a logically better organized language than Greek and Indo-European languages in general.


Questions: A. On the basis of the above fragment, what is the difference between Aristotelian and Mohist categorization? B. How does the author explain this difference?
2. Translate this passage into fluent Chinese.

On the traditional conception of mind deriving from Descartes, the mind is a private inner stage, aptly called the Cartesian theater by some philosophers, on which mental actions take place. It is the arena in which our thoughts, bodily sensations, perceptual sensings, volitions, emotions, and all the rest make their appearances, play out their assigned roles, and then fade away. All this for an audience of one: One and only one person has a view of the stage, and no one else is permitted a look.


3. Translate this passage into fluent Chinese.

Chuang-tzu extends his argument about indexicals to claim that all dichotomies of language behave in the same way. This extension equivocates on different meanings of shih. Shih is both an indexical “this” and a generalized judgment “right,” “correct.” Chuang-tzu’s argument transfers the essentially token reflexive character of demonstrative shih/this to its more general use. He thus jumps from the perspectival relativity of reference to the conventional relativity of judgment.

PART II

A relational view of reality is crucial not only to Buddhism but also to understandings of self and nature in many other Asian traditions of thought, including the major indigenous belief systems of China, Confucianism and Taoism. While Taoism and Confucianism differ and even conflict in significant ways, they share key concepts and values, including an emphasis on the continuity of the universe and the relatedness of all beings in it. Within this context, Confucianism is more "humanistic," stressing the ethical and philosophical dimensions of human society and relationships. Taoism de-emphasizes or relativizes the role of humans in the cosmos, emphasizing instead the value of "flowing with" the Tao, usually defined as the "way" of all things, a sort of law of nature, but also suggesting, in Roger Ames's words, the "natural environment of any particular." Taoism's ultimate goal is harmony with this law or environment, rather than, as in Confucianism, the perfection of human character and society. Wu-wei, usually translated as nonaction or as effortless action, represents the achievement of this harmony with all entities and dimensions of the natural and social worlds. (from Anna Peterson, "Chapter 4: The Relational Self: Asian Views of Nature and Human Nature," Being Human: Ethics, Environment, and Our Place in the World, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001, p. 92.)

2. When talking about the 'common' philosophical enterprise, we mean the kind of reflective inquiries denoted by the expressions in Western phonetic language and Chinese ideographic language respectively: 'philosophy' in English is from the Greek philosophia, which literally means the love of (philo-) wisdom (Sophia); and '哲學', pronounced zhe-xue in Mandarin Chinese, which literally means learning (學) of wisdom or sagacity (哲). However, the Chinese term is a recent creation borrowed from Japanese translation practice. Indeed, traditionally the Chinese did not distinguish between philosophy and religion or other forms of learning. The aspects or layers of Chinese thought distinguished by this modern term are those that coincide most with what Westerners call 'philosophy' in their own tradition. Now, what is philosophy? In the literature, one might find various characterizations: (1) philosophy is the exploration of classic, perennial, or fundamental questions in fields of philosophical study such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and logic (for example, what is being? What are its fundamental features? What is knowledge? How should I live?); (2) philosophy is the exploration of those basic concepts or underlying assumptions in various other fields of study (for example, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of biology, etc.); (3) philosophy can be certain orientations, styles and/or standards of reflective exploration.
such as critical, rigorous, analytic, synthetic, non-authoritarian, non-empirical, etc.; (4) philosophy can be certain characteristic ways of approaching the above fundamental questions or the most basic concepts such as rational justification, semantic ascent (exploring an object through inquiring into (the meaning of) linguistic/conceptual items that signify the object), conceptual analysis, etc. (from Bo Mou, “On Some Methodological Issues concerning Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction,” History of Chinese philosophy, edited by Bo Mou, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 2.)

《爾雅》謂：「此身非汝所有，亦非餘人所有。謂：六觸身，本修行願，受得此身，云何為六？眼觸身處，耳、鼻、舌、身、意觸人處。彼多聞聖弟子於諸緣起，善正思惟，觀察此六識身、六觸身、六受身、六想身、六思身。

所謂：此有故，有當來生，老、病、死、獨、悲、惱、苦；如是，如是，純大苦聚集，是名有因、有緣世間集。謂：此無故，六識身無；六觸身、六受身、六想身、六思身無；謂：此無故，無有當來生，老、病、死、獨、悲、惱、苦。如是，如是，純大苦聚集，若多聞聖弟子於世間集，世間滅如實正知，善見，善覺，善人，是名聖弟子此善法，得此善法，知此善法，入此善法，見如，見世間生死，成就賢聖出離，寂滅，正盡苦，究竟苦邊。所以者何？謂：多聞聖弟子於世間集，滅如實知，善見、善覺、善人故。」（《雜阿含經·第295經》，T. 99, vol. 2, p. 84a-b.)